Abstract: This paper examines the relationships between warfare, taxation, and politic institutions in historical perspective. We focus on nineteenth-century Italy from the end of the Napoleonic era in 1815 to political unification in 1861. The institutional variety at the regional level makes the Italian peninsula a unique testing ground for comparative work. Using a new database, we argue that pre-unitary states pursued different military, fiscal, and political policies in response to diverse external and internal threat environments. Our "analytic narrative" approach complements recent theoretical and econometric works about state capacity. By emphasizing public finances, we also uncover novel insights into the process of state formation in Italy.
Synopsis

"The budget is the skeleton of the state, stripped of any misleading ideologies."
Financial sociologist Rudolf Goldscheid, 1926 1 Public finances are the sinews of state power. A growing theoretical literature examines the interplay between wars, fiscal policy, and economic development.
2 This literature takes inspiration from historical works that investigate the relationship between external conflicts and fiscal innovations that enabled states to gather greater wartime funds. 3 It is also motivated by works in political science that study how the state's ability to raise tax revenues affects the provision of growth-promoting public services. 4 Taken as a whole, the new theoretical literature links the demands of war with fiscal (and political) improvements, and greater fiscal strength with superior public services and thus better economic outcomes. While the key advantage of the new theoretical literature is formal rigor, we claim that its basic weakness remains a lack of detailed empirical support.
This paper examines the fiscal evolution of Italian states from the end of the Napoleonic era in 1815 to political unification in 1861 with that critique in mind. Called the Risorgimento, the unification process was one of the major changes in the geopolitical landscape in nineteenth-century Europe. Furthermore, the institutional variety at the regional level makes pre-unitary Italy a unique testing ground for comparative work. Using a comprehensive new database, we argue that external and internal threats had significant implications for military strength, which in turn had important ramifications for fiscal policy and the likelihood of constitutional reform and related improvements in (growth-enhancing) public services.
5
By investigating the precise links between threat exigencies, military and fiscal decisions, and political change in a specific historical context, our "analytic narrative"
provides novel empirical insights that complement the new theoretical literature. This case-oriented approach also complements recent econometric works that test for the broad economic effects of warfare, taxation, and suffrage reform across many countries and years. 6 Finally, our focus on the fiscal features of pre-unitary states offers a novel perspective on political unification on the Italian peninsula. Most recent works on the Risorgimento downplay fiscal factors, instead emphasizing cultural and social conditions and the development of a shared national identity. 7 Though we do not deny the importance of non-fiscal features, political unification was at base the result of successful military conquest. Our investigation shows how differences in pre-unitary fiscal policies shaped this outcome.
8
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the domestic and foreign political contexts in which the Risorgimento took place, and documents the main events.
Our narrative highlights the key role of the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont (referred to as 5 Our dataset draws on previous studies including Parenti (1956 ), Rossi Ragazzi (1956 ), Felloni (1959 ), Del Pane (1965 , Romani (1982) , Felisini (1990), and Ostuni (1992) . For details, see the Data Appendix. 6 See Persson (2009), Dincecco and Prado (2010) , and Scheve and Stasavage (2010a,b) . 7 See Hearder (1983) , Riall (1994), and Banti (2000) . Older works like Ciasca (1916) and Candeloro (1956-65) consider economic factors. More recently, Federico (2007) shows that the integration of agricultural markets predated political unification, and speculates that this integration put on large display the economic benefits of unification. 8 Here our work is related to Ziblatt (2006) . Certainly, the diverse fiscal features of pre-unitary states influenced the choice of a centralized (versus federalist) political system in the unified Kingdom of Italy after 1861. Also see Riker (1964) , Alesina and Spolaore (2003), and Stavasage (2011a,b) .
Piedmont from here on), which ultimately conquered the whole of the peninsula.
Drawing on our new database, Section 3 shows that, though there were large differences in pre-unitary military and fiscal policies, these differences were not simply the result of divergent development patterns or tax systems. For instance, Piedmont had a large military and high taxation, but was not richer or more tax efficient than other pre-unitary states.
Section 4 thus develops a simple analytic framework that interprets pre-unitary military and fiscal differences in terms of diverse political conditions, and in particular the magnitude of external and internal threats that rulers faced, along with their foreign ambitions. For instance, though its status as a buffer state kept it relatively safe from foreign invasion, Piedmont had a long history of territorial expansion that dated back to the fifteenth century. We argue that rulers could only increase taxation (and in particular direct taxation) beyond some threshold by striking a constitutional bargain that credibly conceded fiscal supremacy to elites through parliament. In turn, elites would devote a portion of new tax funds to non-military public services like railway infrastructure that they desired. We argue that this sort of political deal endured in Piedmont (and Piedmont alone) from 1848 onward.
Our analytic framework yields several predictions about the relationship between threat exigencies and military strength, between military strength and fiscal policy, and between constitutional reform and the provision of non-military public services (i.e., railway infrastructure). Section 5 tests these predictions with a detailed quantitative investigation that further draws on our database, followed by a simple regression analysis that exploits the panel nature of the data. This investigation broadly confirms the framework's predictions. Section 6 concludes with a simple taxonomy of pre-unitary ruler strategies, and discusses the applicability of our analysis to other historical European states. Sources: See Data Appendix.
